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Sarantaris and Prometheus, 
the Idiot and the Thief
You’re wrongly named, Prometheus, Wise-before-the-event!
Wisdom is just the thing you want, if you’ve a mind
To squirm your way out of this blacksmith’s masterpiece!
Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound
To leap or to dance, that is the question.1
Abstract
George Sarantaris wrote at a time when Greece, emerging from the 
traumas of the Great War and the Asia Minor Catastrophe, struggled to 
construct its national physiognomy. Joining the ranks of his better-known 
contemporaries, Sarantaris endeavoured through a noteworthy body of poetry 
and philosophy to grapple with the ambiguity of the human condition; an 
ambiguity that found its most tragic historical expression in the juxtaposition 
of the compassionate Christ-figure and the sanguinary war machine. 
Combining Dostoevsky’s social Christianity, Eastern Orthodox asceticism and 
Kierkegaard’s psychological (and proto-existentialist) orientation of faith, he 
created the model for a spiritual anti-polis that would address in a timely and 
positive manner the angst and nihilism of his age.
Sarantaris and the spiritual anti-polis
In an age where science is the new faith, forever absorbing human truth 
into itself by offering new ways to perpetuate life, to improve it and ultimately 
to raise man above the limitations of his very nature and the frightening 
spectacle of his own death and decay, one wonders what room there is for the 
kind of faith that grounds itself on metaphysical truth or reflection. And yet, 
faced with the prospect of living longer, of realising psychotherapy’s ideal of 
an unrepressed existence, man still despairs, still finds overwhelming this age- 
old sense of his own creatureliness. Man still clings tenaciously to the notion,
2 6 3
C u l t u r e  & I d e n t i t y P ART 3
ideal or myth of a higher being or power, irrespective of whether this power is 
perceived as residing in the vacuum of a transcendental resignation or as being 
a benevolent force operating actively within the world through the enlightened 
vision and faith of its believers. As the eminent Ernst Becker once remarked, ‘we 
need the boldest creative myths, not only to urge men on but also and perhaps 
to help men see the reality of their condition' (Becker 1997: 280).
In the final analysis, human beings do not act simply on the basis of 
empirical truths. They may do so in the cocoon of a laboratory or in the ever- 
diminishing ivory tower, but in the matters that shock, devastate or captivate 
the very depths of their being, they generally act on what they believe to be 
true (rather than on what they empirically know to be true) and on what 
is true for them (rather than for some impersonal erudite consensus). Any 
system of thought that does not address the existential concerns, anxieties 
and hopes that human beings feel in their most private and personal 
moments, on a subjective plane, has a somewhat lopsided view of the world 
and of human beings as they stand within it. Ernst Becker summed this idea 
up nicely when he said (Becker 1997: 283):
Whatever man does on this planet has to he done in the lived truth of the terror 
of creation, of the grotesque, of the rumble of panic underneath everything. 
Otherwise it is false. Whatever is achieved must be achieved from within the 
subjective energies of creatures, without deadening, with the full exercise of 
passion, of vision, of pain, of fear, and of sorrow.
The philosophy and poetry of George Sarantaris, ignored for decades by 
Greek critics for various reasons, is the kind of artistic and intellectual corpus 
that brings balance to the prevailing views of his time, especially because it 
is neither simply despairingly descriptive of the horrors of a world ravaged 
by war nor a desperate grasp at a panacea that will make man forget his 
smallness in the immensity of the forces of nature and world history. Writing 
in the 1930s, Sarantaris was concerned with addressing the powerlessness 
and despair felt by his contemporaries as a result of the war experience, and 
which seemed to find their apocryphal expression in Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
proclamation that ‘God is dead’ - in the courageous acknowledgement, that is, 
that the ‘objective’ values upon which human action and thought had thus far 
constructed their cultural artefacts were no longer valid to the individual who 
had seen behind the veil of civilization and into the abyss. This peering into 
the abyss of maddening existential possibility or of spiritual emptiness beyond
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an ‘objective’ body of values ensured, as Professor Weidle has argued, that 
any ‘subjective’ representation carried the onus of proving its own legitimacy 
(in Kumar 1962: 2). Kumar (1962: 2) added that the works of writers of the 
first quarter of the twentieth century who had experienced the dissolution of 
social myths and the unitary self, and who had experimented with the stream 
of consciousness method (Woolf, Richardson, Joyce and others) embody ‘an 
integrated form of principium individuationis’ and ‘render in a literary medium a 
new realization of experience as a process of dynamic renewal’ (Kumar 1962: 2).
Sarantaris himself experimented with the stream of consciousness 
method in his poetic prose and prose poetry, which have to some extent been 
misconstrued by the Greek monocultural gaze as evidence of the linguistic 
weaknesses considered ‘typical’ o f his Greek-Italian hybridity. Sarantaris was 
very aware of the spectrum of literary methods that flourished within the 
framework of the modernist enterprise, but seemed more comfortable with 
the notion that literary expression (especially poetry) could affect a revolution 
(artistic and social) when it functioned as, or was informed by philosophy.
This conviction crystallised into a relatively large corpus of poems (in Greek 
and Italian) and three philosophical essays (Contribution to a Philosophy of 
Existence, The Presence of Man, An Essay on Logic as a Theory of the Absolute and 
Non-Absolute), which outline not only the connection between foreign and 
Greek literary works to certain philosophical systems and artistic movements, 
but also the role that poetry and philosophy can play in enabling modern man 
to fashion a vision of the world and himself that addresses his anguished soul 
searching in a manner both functional and edifying.
Sarantaris’s philosophical essays bear the unmistakeable mark of youth 
(with all three being published consecutively from the age of 30), steeped 
as they are in a naive enthusiasm that very comfortably paints sweeping 
extravaganzas of world emancipation through a ‘distinctly’ Greek Orthodox 
Christian perspective (Sarantaris, 2001:135), and against the backdrop of 
a war experience that exposed an image of humanity at great odds with 
the Christ-figure. Having said this, it is not unreasonable to see the destiny 
of human culture as connected to an ultimate destiny of man, especially if 
the times are such that individuals are compelled to probe deeply into the 
meaning of their existence. Doing away with a prime mover may certainly 
turn one’s gaze away from a greater end or existential purpose, but it may 
also inspire others to explore the reasons why their world-view is no longer
265
Culture & Ident i t y PART 3
relevant and to find new ways to adapt it to the demands of the times. 
Sarantaris certainly fits into the latter category and in a way that has perhaps 
exceeded the expectations and estimation of his critics. To his credit, he did 
not commit the fallacy of confusing a definite historical formation with the 
idea(l) of Christianity.2
His attempt to counter the despair and fragmentariness of his age 
through an adaptation of Christianity to the needs and concerns that he 
perceives as being central to modern man’s sense of self and understanding of 
the lived world is perhaps not so different (at least on the level of intent) to 
Nietzsche and Heidegger’s re-interpretation of the pre-Socratic philosophers 
as a way of ‘setting right’ the ‘errors’ in the voluminous dialogue of western 
philosophy. Sarantaris is cognizant of the historical function of Christianity 
which ‘entered the world precisely at one of the most critical periods of 
history, at the time of a momentous crisis o f culture' (Florovsky 1974: 21). 
More importantly, he does not ground his image of Christianity on dogma 
or theology, but on philosophy, and in particular, on existentialist thought, 
which was the new gospel of the modernist self.
While Sarantaris’s main claim to an Eastern Orthodox view of 
Christianity is largely based on his reverent appreciation of Dostoyevsky, 
one gets the sense that his affinity with Eastern Orthodoxy stems also from 
an asceticism that is not only in keeping with his personal living habits (he 
chose to live a life of frugality and ethical austerity and of complete devotion 
to his writing) but also with a view of Christianity as a desert-style spiritual 
polis in opposition to an empire in decline. In fact, one would be hard pressed 
to find in Sarantaris’s work any mention of the church or of scripture for 
that matter, in spite of his very apparent preoccupation with God, Christ 
and Christianity (Zoumboulakis 2008: 903). His stance is a little reminiscent 
of John Chrysostom for whom, according to Georges Florovsky, ‘the real 
danger of true piety began precisely with the external victory of the Church, 
when it became possible for a Christian to “ settle down” in this world, with a 
considerable measure of security and even comfort, and to forget that he had 
no abiding City in this world and had to be a stranger and pilgrim on earth’ 
(Florovsky 1974: 124). The model of the homeless or aoikos monk would 
certainly not be out of place in the world of the de-centred, fragmentary 
self, except for one important difference, the inner freedom of the individual 
to choose this state of homelessness. The modernist and the existentialist
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arrive at this same feeling of homelessness, but chiefly because disheartening 
circumstances beyond their control have thrown them into it. They are aoikoi 
out of powerlessness and their freedom is an un-centred or de-centred one, 
based ultimately on an ‘existential anguish among possibilities’ (Brown 1989: 
31).3 The monk chooses to embrace this homelessness as an expression of his 
faith in a centre that is located in another realm but with which he communes 
through his active creation of an anti-polis. His homelessness is thus an 
expression of an empowered and empowering self and of a radically centred 
and centring freedom. As Florovsky observed (1974: 127):
Ascesis does not bind creativity, it liberates it, because it asserts it as an aim in 
itself. Above all -  creativity o f one’s self Creativity is ultimately saved from all 
sorts o f utilitarianism only through an ascetical re-interpretation. Ascesis does 
not consist o f prohibitions. It is activity, a ‘working out’ o f one’s very self. It is 
dynamic. It contains the urge o f infinity, an eternal appeal, an unquenchable 
move forward. The reason for this restlessness is double. The task is infinite 
because the pattern o f perfection is infinite, God’s perfection. No achievement 
can ever be adequate to the goal. The task is creative because something 
essentially new is to be brought in existence. Man makes up his own self in his 
absolute dedication to God. He becomes himself only in this creative process.
The ascetic is not perturbed by the fragmentation of the unitary self 
of Western Man, because his selfhood has never been a static image of a 
self-possessed ego, but a creative project of centring between existential 
potentiality and idealised actuality presided over by a workable, enduring, and 
above all, actualizing faith in the paradox of the Incarnation. Sarantaris took 
the ‘Social Christianity’ (Florovsky 1974:136-37) espoused by Dostoyevsky, 
which sees the ideals of Christianity realised in the projects of social action 
and in a church built on a sense of common responsibility, piety, compassion 
and humility, and combined it with an existentialist view of Christianity that 
is indebted to Soren Kierkegaard, and odd as it may seem, to the Eastern 
Orthodox ascetic ideal. Sarantaris’s praise of Dostoyevsky in Contribution to a 
Philosophy o f  Existence (in Skopetea 2001: 136) was unreserved:
. . .  in answering age-old questions, he exceeds the limits o f the most recent 
philosophies, those which modern man escapes with difficulty in his quest for 
other limits; and I am thinking here o f Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. For 
Dostoyevsky bore with the full breadth o f his soul the primordial and collective 
problem o f civilization, the problem o f Christianity. This action was that o f a
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powerful person, o f  a person who feels the fate o f  his people as his own fate, o f  a 
person who did not seek power in solitude as did Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.4
However his appropriation of Kierkegaard’s thought was not. Sarantaris 
(2001:143) rejected the isolationist bent of Kierkegaard’s thought because 
he perceived Christianity as having a social (though not necessarily 
institutionalised) dimension, and therefore, a social responsibility:
For whosoever has faith, there is no truth other than his truth; for there cannot 
he two truths. Doubt must not be able to be accommodated by your life, so that 
it does not spread to your thinking, to your logical reasoning and to your world­
view to a point where you corrupt other people.5
The individual may feel the full measure of his fallenness in his existential 
anxiety over his sins, but his redemption is a collective endeavour. (I am 
reminded here of the observation by Florovsky who in quoting a Russian scholar 
remarks that ‘man falls alone but is saved collectively’). The religious emphasis 
should accordingly shift from the liberation of man from the consequences 
of his ‘original’ failure to the ‘fulfilment of God’s design for man’ (Florovsky 
1974: 20). While sin is felt in aloneness or inwardness, in hermetic subjectivity, 
faith and hope in redemption reach outwards in acts and words of love and 
compassion. Faith and hope are in Sarantaris’s estimation essentially associative 
and should enhance societal consciousness. For a Christian, as Simone Weil 
(1957: 73) put it, ‘there is no greater sacrilege than insensitiveness toward those 
who suffer’. The nightmare spectacle of a creation ‘that has been soaked for 
hundreds of millions of years in the blood of all its creatures’ (Becker 1997:283) 
rather than prompting the Christian to despair, acts as the impetus propelling 
the believer forward in acts of kindness and humility and in fidelity to a vision 
of heaven on earth (anti-polis). As Sarantaris pointed out in his Contribution to a 
Philosophy o f  Existence (2001: 141):
The border o f  the Anthropos is eternity; The Anthropos does not cross this border 
except in returning, so long as he still has time, to the test o f  the mortal self o f  
his changing nature. And he returns in an attempt to make a single moment o f  
his life tantamount to the time o f  his life; in an attempt on the part o f  his self 
to be justly convinced that a single moment o f  his life has the same absolute 
significance o f  the time o f an entire life (The moment, as Kierkegaard teaches, is 
not a unit o f  time, but a unit o f  eternity) . . .6
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The actualizing power of faith is precisely what makes it an expression 
of inner freedom. Standing before the chaos of existential possibility, 
which in the mind of the modernist writer often leads to paralysis and 
self-fragmentation (Brown 1989),7 the Christian chooses to believe and 
to act on this belief. His faith endures through all adversity and emotional 
confusion because he must actively and freely choose between despair and 
faith, Kierkegaard’s either/or, at every moment of his existence. It is precisely 
this durational movement, expressed in Kierkegaard as the dialectic of 
inwardness, which makes the Christian leaning towards eternity a temporal 
project. For Sarantaris, the real significance of the Danish philosopher’s 
concept of inwardness is that it centres power in the individual, who in facing 
the possibility of despair before the horrors of daily existence and before 
the breakdown of a unitary social self into a multiplicity of potentialities, 
chooses the hopeful creativity embodied in a leap of faith. Faith presupposes 
determinacy, as opposed to determinism or indeterminacy. Powerlessness 
that culminates in despair can perceive life as meaningless either because 
it is based on natural or physical laws that it can never control and thus 
never transcend or be accountable for or because it is lost in a confusion of 
existential possibilities (of equal and, therefore, no distinct value). While 
the human intellect may in detaching itself from the concrete specificity of 
existence play with possibilities and even synthesise the very antinomies its 
reasoning has fashioned for the purposes of identity and generalisation, the 
human being as an ambiguous totality of mind and body and anchored within 
the contingency of its situatedness in time and space must choose between 
either/or if it is to act (freely and responsibly). It must, in short, move within 
the realm of contradictions which it perceives to be real and attached to 
particular outcomes both for itself and for others:
We do not possess nor are we able to attain to a representation of the presence 
of man. Our life neither moves nor wishes to move between representations 
and concepts, as do, for instance, Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer and Hegel. 
(1987:156)8
Clare Carlisle in analysing Kierkegaard’s understanding of becoming 
maintained that ‘in its existential sense, the either/or is connected to the 
individual’s active power to make decisions’ (Carlisle 2005: 55). The source 
of this power, which Sarantaris quite emphatically identified with faith, is in 
Kierkegaard aligned more closely with passion. As Carlisle elucidated (2005: 56):
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. . .  Climacus suggests that passion is the existential correlate o f Aristotle’s 
‘unmoved mover’, which provides the ultimate source o f motion in the cosmos. 
Like Aristotle’s God, passion functions to anchor the flux and relativity o f  
finite existence. Because the aesthete has no passion, his inner world resembles 
Heraclitus’s cosmos: without any fixed points or solid ground, everything is 
true and so nothing is true; everything is in motion and nothing is in motion. 
Affirmation and negation become identical: ‘What am I good for? -  for nothing or 
for everything, ’ sighs the hopeless young man.
Although the empowerment of the individual rests on his fidelity to his 
faith, a fidelity which is experienced as repetitive inward movement, this faith 
is not felt intensely and to a point where its perpetuation and dissemination 
become imperative until it passes first through the filter of thanatophobia. The 
fear of death and its associated anguish are precisely what the individual must 
experience in order to gain an understanding of the eternal underpinnings 
of his mortality and ultimately the responsibility of communicating these to 
humankind through the creative praxis of art and culture:
Only through the contemplation o f death does an unbeliever gain the necessary 
power not only to reach faith but also to create works that will endure, to create, 
in other words, culture. (Sarantaris, 1987:168)9
Mortality anxiety can become, according to Sarantaris, the most 
powerful impetus behind creativity not simply in the silent endurance of 
faith, but also in the poetry, that in aspiring to capture the spirit of man in 
the corporeality of the poetic symbol, pays tribute to the human ambiguity of 
beast and angel. Poetry is the anguished cry of the individual, who removed 
by self-consciousness from the blissful ignorance of nature, feels his body’s 
resistance to the spirit’s call for transcendence in the ‘elusive longing’ of 
existential anxiety (Sarantaris, 1987):
T h e  V i e w  of  the  W o r l d 10
Time, unseen, corrupts 
the view o f the world; 
man becomes absent-minded 
and doesn’t look, 
and if he looks 
he doesn’t see;
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until death
he is tormented by an elusive longing 
while he is corrupted by 
some force
more elusive than time.
Becker’s (1997: 69)comments on the relationship between human 
ambiguity and anxiety in Kierkegaard are particularly enlightening on this 
point:
Man’s anxiety is a function o f his sheer ambiguity and o f his complete 
powerlessness to overcome that ambiguity, to be straightforwardly an animal 
or an angel. He cannot live heedless o f his fate, nor can he take sure control over 
that fate and triumph over it by being outside the human condition.
The feelings of insecurity, isolation, thrownness and meaninglessness 
that culminate in ‘attempts to find non-idealistic understandings of cultural 
artefacts’ and which Ronald Schleifer posits within the context of European 
Modernism’s ‘generational mood of crisis’ (Schleifer 2000: 221) prompt 
a re-evaluation of social and cultural nomic structures (Marks 1974). In 
Sarantaris’s mind, this questioning of societal structures is inextricably linked 
with the lot not only of the nation but of humankind. The rise of existential 
angst is not simply a mark of the decline of civilization. It is the dynamic 
and responsible choice between radically altering dysfunctional nomic 
structures on the basis of humanity perceived either as a species governed by 
the deterministic laws of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and Marx’s historical 
materialism or as a spiritual fellowship grounded in the cosmic (because truly 
existential) heroism of the Theanthropos:
Marxism and Freudianism are theories that sacrifice the person to death without 
even being aware o f it. They are perversions borne o f an unbridled hedonism. On 
the surface they grant hate and in essence the conviction o f death ... the pleasure 
o f death, o f the death o f the entire world, pervades them. This is why our faith in 
existence has a duty to become a world-view. (Sarantaris 1987:151)
Sarantaris renounced these two important influences of the generation 
of the 30s, because both Freud and Marx dismissed faith in God as the 
symptom of a mass neurosis. While Freud’s discovery of the subconscious 
points to an acknowledgement that the whole self can never be represented
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in consciousness and thus outside the temporality of its existence, it fails to 
go beyond the libidinal impulses to longings that would urge the individual 
towards a discovery of his eternal self, the anthropos, felt within time as 
existential angst. This would also probably account for Sarantaris’s suspicion 
towards surrealism. While Marx’s theory of historical materialism rightly 
considers man as anchored within his temporality and ideally enlisted in the 
struggle for emancipation from the shackles of necessity, it sacrifices the 
individual’s potentially divine consciousness to a matter that is indifferent to 
man’s concrete uniqueness. For Sarantaris, literature, the kind of literature 
that truly honours man’s potential to realise the eternal self within him, the 
historical example of the Theanthropos, equates with social action, because it 
bravely confronts death in its bid for immortality, and more importantly, it 
opens up the consciousness of man to the wonder of learning the diachronic 
truths of his existence within the synchronic act of poetic creation and 
interpretation.
Existentialism, in exposing the nothingness of man, the inauthentic 
selves of his complacency and his imprisonment in a civilization that obscures 
this inauthenticity, steers thought towards the importance of seeing the self 
as the locus of durational and existential creativity rather than as a static 
monad or identity. In so far as it emphasises the inauthenticities involved 
in the individual’s entanglement in a culture-bound existence and the need 
for re-assessing the Cartesian cogito as an identity created in abstracto, 
existentialist thought is quite compatible with Sarantaris’s emphasis on 
the historical presence (Theanthropos) of the Divine Logos and on the 
imperative of treating the here-and-now of existence as the uniquely human 
opening towards the eternity intuited within anxiety and as the other face of 
despair. Kierkegaard’s Christian (proto)existentialism with its psychological 
orientation of faith11 as the antidote to existential anxiety offers to Sarantaris 
the perfect platform from which to address the angst and despair of his 
own age in a manner that adapts his Christian viewpoint to new trends in 
philosophical thought and literary expression. It allowed him to demonstrate, 
as T.S. Eliot succinctly put it, that ‘the life of a soul does not consist in the 
contemplation of one consistent world but in the painful task of unifying ... 
jarring and incompatible ones.’ (Brown 1989: 32)
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Sarantaris and the Promethean leap
In writing the second part of this paper, two notions stand uppermost 
in my mind. One notion came from a friend who wisely observed that time 
stands still for punishment, while the second came from an article in the 
Australian newspaper, in which its author argued that the greatest motivator 
of human behaviour and cultural endeavour is a fear of death. One might 
well ask what connection these two notions have to the work of Sarantaris. 
Aeschylus’s depiction of the punishment of Prometheus at the hands of an 
enraged Zeus is, I think, a good visual distillation of the point at which these 
two notions converge.
Prometheus, a symbol of the defiance inherent in the human 
consciousness and will, embodies both the fear of the forces (known and 
unknown) which are greater than him (empathic awareness of the finitude of 
mortals) and the reaction to that fear through theft or displacement (hope 
in his ability to create a uniquely human legacy for posterity). The urge to 
deceive Zeus is ultimately the urge to stand outside the circular or natural 
time (anachronistically, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence) into which his very 
existence throws him by realising his historicity in an act of supreme defiance. 
The limitless repetition of an immortal time is in this single act reduced to 
the conditional and contingent time of mortality, and the divine punishment 
that ensues simply emerges to amplify this single moment of human TtaGoQ 
(suffering/endurance) and defiance. Prometheus’ act of defiance is expressed 
as freedom of the human will (with which he empathically identifies) 
measured against the constraints of the immortal forces that would limit and 
contain it. The very act of binding Prometheus only serves to highlight the 
freedom that is implied in this act of ‘human’ defiance. More importantly, 
Zeus’s decision to punish Prometheus repeatedly reflects in a way the kind 
of angst that is later, in a post-Christian age, associated with guilt or shame. 
Prometheus is reminded constantly of his transgression by being imprisoned 
in the dialectics of a punishment that sees him vacillate between the fear of 
pain (a human fear that makes him recoil) and the decision to defiantly endure 
bondage (a divine will that makes him transcend his pain by looking toward 
the future with the very hope he has given to humans so that they ‘no longer 
foresee their death’) (Vellacott 1961: 28). The angst he feels is experienced as 
the personal duration in which he is continuously reminded of the pain that
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he alone feels and endures in the prison of the mortality-immortality paradox 
that his love for humanity thrusts him into. He is quite prepared, however, 
to stand his ground, to endure the pains heaped upon him by an unrelenting 
and unforgiving Zeus, because he has complete faith in a prophecy that tells 
him that he will eventually be released and that his suffering will act as a 
precursor to the fall of Zeus’s tyrannical reign and the birth of a new world 
order in which humankind will enjoy greater emancipation from the bonds 
of necessity. Prometheus stands as the ultimate visual representation of 
the freedom of the human will, which in the face of extreme punishment 
still chooses to defy Zeus repeatedly and in so doing to transcend his order. 
Prometheus’s relentless defiance is thus the image of the movement of 
the human will and ultimately the freedom inherent in its becoming. The 
repetitive nature of the punishment Prometheus endures is the impetus for 
the movement that characterizes his fidelity to his prophetic vision, to the 
future. This fidelity enables TtdGoq to become an embodiment not simply of 
suffering but also of the profoundly personal passion that both prompts and 
endures it.
I have opened with this image of Prometheus bound but defiant because 
I wished to establish a parallel with the image of Sarantaris as he emerged in 
the testimonies of his friends and biographers, an image that seems to have, 
at times, eclipsed even the need for a systematic and in-depth assessment 
of his unique contribution to Greek letters. The parallel with Prometheus 
may seem strange, given that Sarantaris is often presented as a young 
intellectual who was completely devoid of the social graces or practicality that 
were expected of an artist of his era.12 While poets of his generation were 
attempting to adapt their poetry to the immediate demands of their society 
and to the ideal of the ‘action man’, Sarantaris chose to live on the meagre 
rental income he earned from a small inheritance and to devote his time and 
energy to his writing. He had attained a doctorate in law, but never practised 
as a lawyer, much to the dismay of his entrepreneurial father. He has been 
described as awkward to the point of appearing somehow otherworldly, 
indifferent to politics and laughably naive in behaviour and outlook. Overall, 
the image that emerges from the testimonies gathered posthumously by his 
critics is that of a feeble young man with an intelligence and world-view that 
were removed from the harsh realities of his time, and more importantly, 
from the methods and movements adopted by his contemporaries to
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address them. The literary historian Mario Vitti (1979: 94) maintained that: 
‘Sarantaris’ experiences occurred within a context that was consciously 
and obstinately kept narrow for the sake of intensity. His experience 
appears all the more limited and stifling when we compare it to the breadth of 
interests and combative vigour of Nikita Rantos, the social revolutionary who 
discarded Karyotakism using entirely different means’.13 Sarantaris’s apparent 
indifference to politics would certainly have made him appear somewhat 
of an anomaly to his contemporaries. However, his regular contribution to 
several literary journals in Thessaloniki and Athens, including the famous 
Nea Grammata, together with his consistent participation in philosophical 
debate at the University of Athens (which the Nobel Laureate Odysseus Elytis 
admiringly comments on in his ‘Chronicle of a Decade’)14 point to a thinker 
that is very interested in the issues of the day, and who rather than being 
politically apathetic, perceives politics as either irrelevant to these issues or an 
ineffective way of addressing them. It is important to note here that Greece 
had in its liberation from the Ottoman yoke, and especially in its subsequent 
project of nation building, perceived itself through the eyes of a (western) 
European centre.15 The quest for Greekness that characterized the work of 
many of the writers of the generation of the 30s was a telling symptom of 
precisely this. Sarantaris differed from his contemporaries in that he was not 
merely indifferent to the predominant European influences of his day but was 
diametrically opposed to them (Sarantaris 1987: 135):
I think that modern day Greece can critically assess so-called Western 
Civilization; it can and must critically assess such a civilization, if it wants to 
escape the influence that Europe has had on us for an entire century, if it wishes 
to discover the clarity of a pristine view of things and the authentic beauty of our 
country and its people; a criterion of truth for all of the people of the earth.16
Moreover, Sarantaris promulgated a redefining of the Greek geist 
through less popular currents of thought that he felt were closer to an 
‘authentic’ rather than ‘European’ Greece. He envisaged the establishment 
of a spiritual fellowship grounded in an Eastern Orthodox and Existentialist 
(both as he defined them, of course) Christianity as a counter-position to 
the more popular nihilistic theories of his time. Finally, he saw poetry as 
an important antidote to (rather than chronicle of) the greatest malady of 
modernity, despair. In the light of all this, he can perhaps still be understood 
as ‘otherworldly’ but only in the sense of exemplifying the kind of creative
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anomie that the death of God invites. God, or any other image of immortality, 
is not unlike Prometheus’s liver in this respect. Its death becomes the 
necessary precursor to regeneration and rebirth. Anomie through punishment 
and suffering becomes not the reaffirmation simply of concrete instances of 
the nomic but an affirmation of nomos proper. Poetry within the context of a 
culture in crisis can perform an associative function; it can tap into the fluid 
and ‘obscure collective consciousness’ of society, which Durkheim deemed 
‘unconsidered' and inaccessible (Marks 1974: 342), and creatively transform 
the anomic, the mythic and the otherworldly into nomic structures within a 
more broadly realised societal and human consciousness:
G o d 17
Poetry The world is sea My mind 
invisible it suffers 
My mind I wants to receive body 
consubstantial
blossom on the surface o f  vision 
susurration upon the flux 
The sun song relieves the sea 
it fashions the clarity o f  its waves 
I feel everywhere:
I see the sea 
the sun
nothingness perhaps
I’m dreaming o f a human being
To return to the parallel I have drawn between Aeschylus’s Prometheus 
and Sarantaris, I would venture to add here a third image in the hope of 
synthesizing the former two. The image is that of Dostoyevsky’s Prince 
Myshkin in the Idiot who beautifully encapsulates an inversion of Durkheim’s 
concept of anomie. Dostoevsky’s Idiot can perhaps be linked to Prometheus 
on the basis of the words spoken by Ocean to Prometheus in Aeschylus’s 
Prometheus Bound, and quoted by Simone Weil in her marvellous book 
Intimations o f  Christianity among the Ancient Greeks (1957: 59): ‘There is no 
greater gain than to appear mad because one is good’.
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Further, Dostoevsky’s idiot can be linked to Sarantaris on the basis of his 
realisation that ‘I loved generously, without foresight, without ulterior motive, 
without the prospect of gain; I was, in other words, a perfectly undignified 
person in the eyes of many. And one day I realised that I had never been 
taken seriously.’18 Just as Prince Myshkin endures the relentless ridicule and 
inauthenticity (that is, punishment) of those around him to a point where 
he retreats from the world in a state of resignation or ‘enlightened’ madness, 
so too does Prometheus withdraw from the world of mortals and immortals 
to endure the punishment and suffering at the hands of Zeus. In both cases, 
a deeply personal conviction or passion opens a divide between both (anti) 
heroes and the accepted (nomic) order of things. The suffering in both 
instances is connected to the getting of a wisdom that is both transcendental 
and concrete; transcendental in so far as it understands and knows beyond the 
confines of logic and reason, and concrete in so far as it can only come to an 
individual through the suffering that he endures alone, in and with his body 
and his time. Simone Weil conveys this notion with her usual eloquence when 
she says (1957: 57):
Unlike certain morbid valuations o f our time, the Greeks never attributed value 
to suffering for its own sake. The word they chose to designate suffering, 71<X'&oq, 
is one which evoked above all the idea o f enduring more than o f suffering. Man 
must endure that which he does not want. He must find himself in submission to 
necessity. Misfortunes leave wounds which bleed drop by drop even during sleep; 
and thus, little by little, they break a man by violence and make him fit, in spite 
o f himself, to receive wisdom, that wisdom which expresses itself in moderation. 
Man must learn to think of himself as a limited and dependent being, suffering 
alone can teach him this.
In both cases the prospect and experience of suffering do not culminate 
in despair, for suffering is embraced as the only path to wisdom. The force that 
mediates between the TtdOoq and the ¡juxGoq is hope precisely because it gives 
boytiT,ov, that is, meaning or purpose to the suffering, as well as movement to 
the inwardness or self-consciousness that persists in repetition through the 
forbearance of pain. Simone Weil expressed this very notion when she noted 
that (1957: 75): ‘All Greek civilization is a search for bridges to relate human 
misery and divine perfection.’ Hope, by this reckoning, is ultimately the 
impetus behind the movement involved in the willing to endure suffering. It
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is the kind of m ovem ent th a t makes the invisible m anifest in the unfolding 
or becoming of revelation, a m ovem ent expressed perhaps in Heidegger’s 
analysis of aletheia as the  shift from  concealm ent (oblivion) to unconcealm ent 
(un-oblivion).
Through their lack of fit w ith  the questionable nomic struc tu res of their 
societies, bo th  Prom etheus and  the Idiot become living em bodim ents of the 
com prom ise th a t is forged betw een the h igher consciousness of the  powers 
th a t be and the  lower consciousness of the masses. In o ther words, the ir 
suffering is an aspect of the ir gatekeeping. Aeschylus’s Prom etheus gives fire 
and knowledge to m ortals, so th a t they m ight achieve through  these tangibles 
an indirect understanding  of things invisible and divine. Dostoevsky’s Idiot 
in his anom ic w ithdrawal from  Petersburg society offers through his Christ- 
like example a reflection of w hat his society has become. The Prom ethean 
leap, therefore, consists in the bridging of a divide betw een the highest level 
of consciousness, epitom ised in the om niscient Zeus, and  the  lower level 
of consciousness, em bodied in the  yet unenlightened m asses of m ortals. 
P rom etheus’s the ft is essentially his assertion  of his role as ‘gatekeeper’,19 his 
a ttem p t to render an inaccessible divine consciousness (Zeus’s omniscience) 
accessible to hum ankind th rough  the  struc tu res of societal consciousness (fire 
and the a rts  and sciences). His defiance is a symbol of the anomie inheren t in 
the  transition  from old gods to new ones (a transition  tha t, incidentally, does 
no t adm it the  possibility of an  annih ilation  of gods altogether). The Idiot’s 
leap consists in the  faith th a t makes every instance of suffering a piece in 
the  edifice of the alternative world he creates w ith his duration  and w ith his 
painful alienation.
Sarantaris, who lost his life (to the indignation  of m any of his friends 
and critics)20 at the  hands of nomic struc tu res th a t placed a sensitive 
intellectual in the frontline of war ra ther than  in an office position 
com m ensurate w ith his skills, seem ed very m uch the Idiot in term s of his 
child-like faith in and honesty  tow ards o thers. However, w hat the Idiot in him  
inscribed on the  m inds of those who rem em ber him w ith fondness or regret, 
the  Prom etheus in him  achieved in a leap of faith not only in the fu ture of 
Greece bu t in the future of poetry. The poetic word, according to Sarantaris, 
is the greatest leap of faith  because it offers a cross-section of the complex 
m om ents of an individual’s duration; it houses bo th  the  tem porality  tha t
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engenders it and the yearnings that compel it to seek the eternity that it 
intuits in the lacunae of existence and in its quest for meaning:21
An even i n g 22
An evening
the most tame evening, 
finds us alone 
in a corner 
o f the town
where the children have left 
and also the dogs, 
they’ve closed the shops 
they’ve put out the lights 
and no-one stands guard
Starving
thirsty
we are not devoured by despair
When all social myths stand in ruins, leaving the cultural self in a ‘tame 
darkness’, bereft of any support or consolation, and without even the facade 
of a complacent social existence, the poet, and the spiritual fellowship that he 
sees himself as part of, uses the longing for immortality and meaning (here 
starvation and thirst and perhaps an allusion to the Eucharist) and the poetry 
this gives birth to as weapons against doubt and despair.23 Poetry in an age 
that has no adequate code with which to articulate its angst is a leap of faith 
over the divide between a past whose relevance has expired and an uncertain 
future, whose relevance has yet to be discovered. It is the poetic imagination 
which opens up vistas of existential possibility for the self, removing 
temporality from the mire of a disappointing ‘everydayness’ and a traumatic 
recent history and placing it on the level of an achievable, universally 
significant selfhood.
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Notes
1 To contextualise this statement, see Deleuze as quoted in Clare Carlisle (2005:139): ‘It then 
becomes easy to speak of the differences between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Even this question, 
however, must no longer be posed at the speculative level of the ultimate nature of the God
of Abraham or the Dionysus of Zarathustra. It is rather a matter of knowing what it means to 
“produce movement”, to repeat or to obtain repetition. Is it a matter of leaping, as Kierkegaard 
believes? Or is it a matter of dancing, as Nietzsche thinks? ... Nietzsche’s leading idea is to ground 
the repetition in eternal return on the death of God and the dissolution of the self. Kierkegaard 
dreams of an alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. All sorts of differences follow: is the 
movement in the sphere of the mind, or in the entrails of the earth which knows neither God nor 
self? Where will it be better protected against generalities, against mediations?’
2 ‘When “Culture” is resisted or denied by Christians, it is always a definite historical formation 
which is taken to be representative of the idea. In our days it would be the mechanized or 
“Capitalistic” civilization, inwardly secularized and therefore estranged from any religion.’ 
(Florovsky 1974: 22).
3 This comment by Brown (1989: 31) was made in the narrower context of an analysis of Eliot’s 
Prufrock and in the broader context of a view of the modernist self as being self-consciously 
fragmented, caught in a paralysis of existential possibility and uncentred freedom.
4 This is my translation.
5 This is my translation.
6 This is my translation.
7 See Dennis Brown(1989: 51): ‘The Great War, then, enforced a twofold message on those who 
were to produce its literature: the final fragmentariness of the self under fire, and the socialism of 
the serving self as self-distribution into disparate army roles and functions. Both are expressed
in war literature. And both have their legacy in post-war Modernism where the disjunctive self 
is simultaneously the socially dispersed self.’ Also: ‘The tendency of Modernist literature, of 
course, is to explore the dynamics of this paradox rather than to resolve it rationally, stressing 
both the absurdity and the poignancy of the inauthentic man. At the same time, its discourse, 
which stresses the fragmentary nature of selfhood, dissipates the notion of ‘the unity of a single 
consciousness’ which informs Sartre’s neo-Cartesian approach. It is closer to Lacan’s formulation: 
“I think where I am not, therefore I am not where I think”.’ (Brown 1989: 110).
8 This is my translation.
9 This is my translation.
10 This is my translation.
11 See ‘The Psychoanalyst Kierkegaard’ in Ernst Becker, The Denial of Death, (1997: 68): ‘There 
have been several good attempts to show how Kierkegaard anticipated the data of modern clinical 
psychology. Most of the European existentialists have had something to say about this, along with 
theologians like Paul Tillich. The meaning of this work is that it draws a circle around psychiatry 
and religion; it shows that the best existential analysis of the human condition leads directly into 
the problems of God and faith, which is exactly what Kierkegaard had argued.’
12 See especially Elytis’ description of him in Anoihta Hartia, 3i ekdosi, Ikaros, Athina, 1987, ‘To 
Hroniko mias Dekaetias’, pp. 344-346.
13 This is my translation.
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14 See Odysseas Elytis, Anoihta Hartia, 3i ekdosi, Ikaros, Athina, 1987, ‘To Hroniko mias 
Dekaetias’, pp. 343-344.
15 Elytis also saw Greece as being misunderstood by Europeans. See Odysseus Elytis, op. cit.,
‘To Hroniko mias Dekaetias’, p. 454: ‘The difficulty o f connecting the Western spirit to the 
Eastern; the misinterpretation o f the depths o f the Greek spirit by foreigners, which encumbered 
communication between us and for which we were responsible; the mission o f Poetry in our age; 
the metaphysical need beyond the typology o f any religion; the significance o f language and its 
relationship with other phenomena of nature and the spirit; the resurgence o f the problematics o f 
form and in the context o f modern poetry ... would come to constitute the axis o f the codification 
o f my conclusions.’ This is my translation.
16 This is my translation.
17 This is my translation.
18 «Aycmouoa acpsihcoc, yajpic jtpovor|xtK6xr|xa, /«p ip  ixjxepo(3ouX,(a, ympig va £r|xco avxa/J.dypxxxa, 
fipouva 6r|X,a6f| ¿vac; dvGpamoq pe xe/.eia ava£wmp67i8ux oxa pdxia xou 7t/.f|0ouc. Kai pia |x£pa 
Kaxd/.aPa 7xcoQ 6e p’ ¿Ttaipvav oxa oopapa». This is my translation and my emphasis.
19 In answering the question: What structural counterpart could possibly give rise to a 
distinctively societal culture? Dukheim outlined two alternatives: ‘The first was that everyone in 
society may somehow interact with everyone else. Unfortunately, “ [the mass] has no unity, is not 
gathered within one enclosure, and its attention cannot be applied at the same moment to the 
same object”. The second seemed to be the only solution, and this was to look for “gatekeepers” to 
the society -  persons or associations whose members were recruited from the society at large and 
served a function o f mediating and articulating “society”. It would be possible, at least in theory, 
for everyone in the society to receive information from these gatekeepers and relay feedback
in various ways. The result would still be an emergent societal “nomos,” only obtained through 
means o f social interactions that were indirect.’ (Marksl974: 338).
20 Elytis expressed his pain over the loss o f his friend in Anoihta Hartia: ‘He was the only and 
most unjust loss ... 1 would like at this moment, and very frankly, to accuse the army mobilization 
system which prevailed at that time and which (I still am at a loss to understand how) managed 
to retain in its Offices and Commissariat all o f the thick-skinned beasts o f Athens’ patisseries 
and to send to the front the purest and most defenceless being. He was a fragile intellectual who 
could barely stand, who had just managed to come up with the most original and benevolent ideas 
for Greece and her future. It was more or less an assassination. He was a graduate o f an Italian 
university -  perhaps the only graduate in the entire army -  he could have been indispensable to 
whichever of the Services had undertaken the counter-espionage or the interrogation o f hostages. 
But no! He had to bear the burden o f the heavy knapsack and armaments, so that yet another poet 
could be lost in the snow-laden gorges, another innocent sacrificed on the road o f torment.’ This is 
my translation. Odysseus Elytis, op. cit., in ‘To Hroniko mias Dekaetias’, p. 393.
21 Julia Kristeva (1993: 53) made an interesting observation that seems relevant to this point: 
‘Perception o f present reality is a disappointment, and only the imagination can provide lasting 
enjoyment, in its quest for what is absent...’ .
22 This is my translation.
23 Ernest Becker (1973: 91) expressed this notion very aptly when he said: ‘Out o f the ruins o f the 
broken cultural self there remains the mystery o f the private, invisible, inner self which yearned 
for ultimate significance, for cosmic heroism. This invisible mystery at the heart o f every culture 
now attains cosmic significance by affirming its connection with the invisible mystery at the heart 
o f creation. This is the meaning o f faith.’
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